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ABSTRACT.  While the doctrine of good faith has always played 
a role in South African contract law, it is currently being 
reshaped by the courts under a banner of “transformative 
constitutionalism”.  Of particular interest in this development 
is the role of an indigenous value of fair dealing, captured by 
the vernacular term “ubuntu”.  The article will (1) compare 
the Canadian findings in Bhasin with the current South 
African status quo, and (2) comment on the evolving legal 
culture of contract in South Africa.  In this regard, the role and 
meaning of ubuntu will be contextually evaluated using social 
science materials.   In combination, this will provide a 
uniquely South African perspective on an area of contract law 
which is evolving in the Commonwealth. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What standard of behaviour is expected of contracting 
parties when interacting in the market-place?  Is there a notional 
(business) community, whose values frame the setting of this 
standard?  If so, how do we define that community and against 
whose set of values are we going to establish this frame of 
reference?  In comparative law, legal culture is often 
determinative of the answer to this type of question.1  In 
modern diverse societies, legal cultures may vary within a 
particular country – giving rise to the notion of legal pluralism.2  
This article has a twofold aim: first, to outline in broad terms an 
answer to the initial question posed as to the prevailing legal 
standard of contractual conduct with regard to positive law in 
South African courts; secondly, to discuss this question from a 
plural point of view, including the South African indigenous 
law perspective.  Aim one will involve setting out the familiar 
concepts of comparative contract law; aim two will encompass 
a more law and society account of contract practice in South 
Africa’s “popular economy”.3   
 
 1 From a comparative law theory perspective, the “legal transplants” debate 
illustrates this point well: O. Kahn-Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative 
Law” (1974) 37 MLR 1; A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 
(2ed University of Georgia Press 1993); P. Legrand, “The Impossibility of ‘Legal 
Transplants’” (1997) 4 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L  111.  In South Africa, the seminal 
text on legal culture (in a slightly different context) is:  K. Klare, “Legal Culture and 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14  SAJHR146. 
 2 For a definition of legal pluralism, see for example: J. Griffiths, “What is 
Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24  J Leg Plur & Unoff L1.  For a South African view, see  T. 
Bennett, “African Customary Law” in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds), Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, 2008) 641, 666-71. 
 3 The term popular economy is intended here to refer in particular to the 
informal economies of many of South Africa’s large urban “townships” (see note 11 
below).  The term popular economy is preferred, since there are many elements of 
the formal economy which influence this sector. The concept will be unpacked 
further below in part III.  For an introduction see E. Hull & D. James, “Introduction: 
Popular Economies in South Africa” 82 Africa 1. The other articles in the same 
volume of this journal are also in point. 
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The question as to whether there is a duty of good faith 
in a given system of contract law is an ideological question, 
which can be used in many cases as a defining characteristic of 
different legal families in comparative contract law.  As the 
cliché goes: in Germany (as a Civil law example at one end of 
the spectrum) all contracts are based on good faith – this is so 
trite that it goes without saying;4 in English law (to take the 
Common law5 archetype at the other end of the range) good 
faith is exceptionally controversial – there is no default rule or 
standard against which to judge contractual conduct, fair 
dealing is ensured through other technical rules, such as those 
on misrepresentation.6  In between, one might place a mixed 
legal system like South African law, which (arguably) under 
English law influence has historically maintained a fairly 
conservative line on the role of a positive duty of good faith in 
contract law, while still claiming that all contracts were based 
on an underlying requirement of good faith conduct which was 
not independently actionable.7  Thus for a South African 
 
 4 Section 242 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB).  For discussion, see S. 
Whittaker & R. Zimmermann, “Good faith in European contract law: surveying the 
legal landscape” in R. Zimmermann & S. Whittaker (eds), Good Faith in European 
Contract Law (CUP 2000) 7, 18-32; B.S. Markesinis, H. Unberath & A. Johnston, The 
German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise - (2nd ed, Hart 2006) 119-33. 
 5 In this article, “Common law” (upper case “C”) is used to denominate the 
legal family originating in English law; “common law” (lower case “c”) is used to 
denominate the South African common law, which is a slightly different concept, 
briefly defined below at the beginning of part II. 
 6 See eg Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 
QB 433 (CA) 439; Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) 138; Mid Essex Hospital Services 
NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200 [105]; Lord 
Steyn, “Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men” (1997) 
113 LQR 433. See, however, Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd 
[2013] EWHC 111 (QB) [119]-[154]. 
 7 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [22]; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 
323 (CC) [81]-[82].  See also R. Zimmermann, “Good faith and equity” in R. 
Zimmermann and D. Visser (eds), Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South 
Africa (OUP 1996) 217, 239-41; D. Hutchison, “Good faith in the South African law of 
contract” in R. Brownsword, N.J. Hird & G. Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: 
Concept and Context (Ashgate 1999) 213, 213-14. 
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interested in comparative contract law, the finding by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Bhasin v Hrynew that good faith 
was an organising principle of the Canadian law of contract and 
that it encompassed a minimum core of honesty in performance 
of contractual duties, was an extremely interesting one.8  This is 
both because Canada belongs to the Common law family, 
making this finding a departure from tradition, and because in 
making that finding, the Canadian Supreme Court engaged in 
a useful and detailed discussion of what the standard of good 
faith in contract law involves. 
For the comparative lawyer, perhaps the most 
interesting and unusual part of contemporary South African 
contract law is the synthesis being crafted here between 
indigenous values and the common law of contract.9  A perfect 
study of this is the ongoing process of judicial development of 
norms of fair dealing in contract.  Value laden open norms in 
contract law provide the ideal vehicle for a discussion of what 
values should go into setting this standard.  We have several 
open norm contenders, however: from public policy, to good 
faith, to (much more recently) ubuntu.  So-called 
“transformative constitutionalism”10 rests on these open norms, 
particularly public policy.  What role can there be for good faith 
as a separate standard, largely side-lined by the Constitutional 
Court thus far?  And what is the difference between good faith 
and ubuntu – is this the indigenous law functional equivalent 
of the good faith concept?   
 
 8 Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494 [33]. 
 9 In South African contract law this development currently centres on the role 
of “ubuntu” (an indigenous African value of communal solidarity).  This concept and 
the nature of the process of synthesis will be discussed in detail below. 
 10 See the definition of this concept in Klare, “Legal Culture and 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (n 1) 150.  See further [Former Chief Justice of the 
Constitutional Court] P. Langa, “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 
Stellenbosch L Rev 351; [Former Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court] D. 
Moseneke, “Transformative Constitutionalism: its Implications for the Law of 
Contract” (2009) 20 Stellenbosch L Rev 3. 
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In my view, an appropriate method of pegging a 
minimum standard of good faith should be a contextual one, 
residing in the study of contract practice.  It can also implicate 
community mores at the micro-level.  Given the emphasis on 
indigenous values present in modern South African contract 
law, an appropriate standard of fair dealing could be sought in 
both the refined interior of a plush Johannesburg boardroom, 
as well as the more vibrant setting of the popular economy of 
one of South Africa’s many urban “townships”.11  Here we may 
refine our approach to fair dealing, from one termed “good 
faith” to a new concept of “ubuntu”.  Whether the same 
standard should apply to boardroom conduct dealing with 
transactions between companies as applies to transactions 
between natural persons, is an important element of this 
standard setting exercise in my view. 
The article will proceed as follows:  In the next part II, I 
will set out the relevant black letter law on good faith and other 
standard-setting open norms in South African contract law.  I 
will unpack the relevant concepts very briefly and give a picture 
of the historical context and development of the law.  In part III, 
there will be a sharp turn to a different South African business 
context: I will draw on social science materials from various 
disciplines to set out an argument as to the nature of ubuntu in 
the popular economy.  In part IV, I will return to positive law, 
building on parts II and III on South Africa to inform a 
comparative engagement with the Canadian Bhasin case.  I will 
argue that commercial practice from all business contexts 
should inform commercial law, and in different context-
sensitive ways.  I will also attack the utopian idealism which 
 
 11 A legacy of the spatial separation of communities along racial lines under 
Apartheid is the separate, largely indigenous African settlements on the edges of 
most South African towns (or in pockets of land within cities which were designated 
for African settlement by urban planners of the former era). Despite democracy and 
universal enfranchisement, economic inequality along racial lines is a continuing 
South African reality. Thus these townships, often including both formal housing 
and informal settlements, remain largely populated by black South Africans.   
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South African courts are developing around the concept of 
ubuntu in contract.  My aim is to argue against a blunt and 
reductive judicial discretion to intervene in contractual 
relations.  In part V, I will conclude.   
II. GOOD FAITH IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW OF 
CONTRACT: 
A Narrative Account 
“The development of our economy and contract law has thus 
far predominantly been shaped by colonial legal tradition 
represented by English law, Roman law and Roman Dutch 
law.”12 
The South African common law of contract is a blend of 
uncodified Roman Dutch law and English law.13  This is the 
historical legacy of two successive colonial powers.  When one 
refers to the “common law of contract” in South Africa, one 
refers not just to the branch of the law made by the courts, but 
also to the underlying sources of the old Roman Dutch 
authorities, which remain a binding source of law.14  The 
common law edifice built during the twentieth century in South 
Africa has increasingly come under attack in contemporary 
times.  Some scholars view the common law as a repository of 
antiquated values, crafted through a process of formalism to 
entrench inequalities in society, including those based on race.15  
 
 12 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 
256 (CC) [23] (Yacoob J for the minority). 
 13 Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity” (n 7) 217; H.R. Hahlo & E. Kahn, 
The South African Legal System and its Background (Juta 1968) 585-586. 
 14 Hahlo & Kahn, The SA Legal System (n 13) 585-86; F. du Bois (ed), Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law (9th edn,  Juta 2007) 64-67. 
 15 See also M. Chanock, The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936 
(CUP 2001); D. Bhana, “The Role of Judicial Method in Contract Revisited” (2015) 132 
SALJ 122; J. Barnard-Naudé, “Of Dorothy’s Dog, ‘Poststructural’ Fairy Tales … and 
the Real: Power, Poverty and the General Principles of the South African Law of 
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Many South African university students hold even more radical 
views, with “decolonisation” being the current catchword in 
vogue.16  Klare’s view17 that the South African legal system is a 
product of a conservative legal culture is undoubtedly true, but 
adherence to the conservative mould is fast going out of fashion 
in this jurisdiction, including in the courts.18  Under the banner 
of “transformative constitutionalism”, another catch-phrase of 
the democratic era, the Constitutional Court has moved away 
from formalism to a more substantive, particularist approach to 
adjudication.19  This process is supported by a large amount of 
statute law, which sets up a parallel regime of contracting for 
consumers, employees, residential tenants, and other weaker 
parties.20  Through the interpretation of these statutes on the one 
hand, and the development of the common law of contract itself 
on the other, the Constitutional Court has begun the process of 
remodelling South African contract law along grounds 
perceived to be more just and equitable.21   
 
Contract” (2013) 29 SAJHR 469; Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative 
Constitutionalism’ (n 1) see in particular part III. 
 16 For a narrative account of the student protest movement (2015 onwards) see 
S. Booysen (ed.), Fees Must Fall: Student Revolt, Decolonisation and Governance in South 
Africa (Wits UP 2016). There is of course a detailed discourse on decolonisation and 
postcolonial theory: this article will not engage this literature, although the influence 
of this philosophy is growing rapidly in South African academia. 
 17 Klare, “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (n 1) 166-72.  
 18 I will give examples of judgments that illustrate this point in what follows. 
For an academic view, see for example the sources cited in note 15 above. 
 19 For a view supporting this process, see Bhana, “The Role of Judicial Method 
in Contract”.  For a note of caution, see M. Wallis, “Commercial Certainty and 
Constitutionalism: Are They Compatible” (2016) 133 SALJ 545. 
 20 See eg Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008; National Credit Act 34 of 2005; 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997; 
Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999. 
 21 For the leading cases, see Barkhuizen (n 7); Everfresh (n 12); Maphango v 
Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC); Botha v Rich NO 2014 (4) SA 
124 (CC); Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); Malan v City of Cape Town 
2014 (6) SA 315 (CC); Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 (3) SA 479 
(CC); Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Ltd (2016) 1 SA 621 
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A.  Historical Background 
An detailed legal history of the sources on good faith in 
South African contract law has been provided by Zimmermann, 
who traces the development of the doctrine over time in the 
South African courts up to the date of his publication in 1996.22  
As is customary in a South African common law doctrinal 
history, this narrative begins with Roman law, particularly the 
procedural device of the exceptio doli generalis, which was a 
defence against fraud under the verbal formulary contracts of 
classical Roman law.23  The need for this device died out in the 
later development of the Roman law of contract by medieval 
European scholars, however, since with the demise of the strict 
formulary procedures of Roman contract formation, all 
contracts were said to rest on a doctrine of good faith.24  This 
was equally true of historic Roman Dutch law, as a particular 
national blend of the received Roman law and contemporary 
Dutch custom.25   
This historical background is relevant to South Africa, 
since during the formative twentieth century period, the 
prevailing technique of legal development was to search for 
rules through the study of the Roman Dutch sources.26  As a 
 
(CC); Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC); Nkata v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2016 (4) 
SA 257 (CC);  
 22 Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity” (n 7); Hutchison, “Good faith in the 
SA law of contract” (n 7). 
 23 Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity” (n 7) at 218-20; Hutchison, “Good 
faith in the SA law of contract” (n 7) 215-16. 
 24 Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity” (n 7) 218-20; Hutchison, “Good 
faith in the SA law of contract” (n 7) 215-16.  
 25 Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity”(n 7) 218-20 Hutchison, “Good faith 
in the SA law of contract” (n 7) 215-16.  On the composition of Roman Dutch law 
itself, see Hahlo & Kahn, The SA Legal System (n 13) 514-17. 
 26 See Hahlo & Kahn, The SA Legal System (n 13) 578-96; Chanock, The Making 
of SA Legal Culture (n 15) 12-16 (this is an example of an important general argument 
throughout Chanock’s book). See also the judgments of Joubert JA in Mutual & 
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quirk of South African legal history, the procedural device of 
the exceptio doli generalis was employed occasionally to provide 
a defence based on equitable grounds – essentially one of “good 
faith”.27  The device served on several occasions as a doctrinal 
peg on which to hang a more detailed equitable rule (such as 
estoppel by representation).28  In only a very limited number of 
cases, however, was the device itself decisive of the matter at 
hand, rather than used indirectly to support a more specific rule 
of contract law.29  In the last case in this line, Bank of Lisbon v De 
Ornelas, the then apex Appellate Division cut short this 
development by pointing out that the use of the exceptio doli 
generalis in South Africa was not based on historically sound 
credentials, and then went on to excise this defence from South 
African law as a “defunct anachronism”.30   
One year later in 1989, the Appellate Division retreated 
slightly on the question of fair dealing, however, to develop the 
public policy rule to allow for the control of contract terms 
deemed “unconscionable” in Sasfin v Beukes.31  There the court 
struck down a deed of cession of an individual’s book debts to 
a bank, since certain unseverable terms therein were found to 
be contrary to public policy and hence invalid.32  The widely 
worded powers conferred on the bank were interpreted as 
 
Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 (1) SA 419 (A); Bank of Lisbon 
and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
 27 See eg Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282, 292-293; Zuurbekom Ltd 
v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 (1) SA 514 (A) 535ff; Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 
1976 (3) SA 16 (A) 27-28; Randbank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W) 214-215.   
 28 See eg Connock’s (SA) Motor Co Ltd v Sentraal Westelike Ko-operatiewe 
Maatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 47 (T) 49. The reception of estoppel and other English law 
devices is discussed in detail in Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity” (n 7). 
 29 The clearest case in point is Randbank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W).  
See also Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity” (n 7) 232-36; Hutchison, “Good faith 
in the SA law of contract” (n 7) 217-22.   
 30 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 607. 
 31 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 7H-9G. 
 32 ibid 18F-19G. 
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effectively turning the debtor into the slave of the financier.33  
Since Sasfin, good faith has largely been side-lined in the 
leading judgments, with public policy being developed as the 
relevant equitable rule instead.34  This meant, however, that the 
law focused on illegality/unconscionability to control 
contracting ex post, rather than enforcing an ex ante and 
continuing standard of good faith conduct at all stages in the 
contracting process.   
Support for a separate doctrine of good faith lived on in 
South Africa despite the Appellate Division’s conservative 
position and this term began to creep back into the law reports 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s.35  Once again, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal halted this development in Brisley v Drotsky in 
2002.36  The court stressed there that good faith was not an 
independent cause of action on which to attack contractual 
behaviour and that at most it was an underlying value, given 
effect to by other more technical doctrines: 
What emerges quite clearly from recent academic writing and 
from some of the leading cases, is that good faith may be 
regarded as an ethical value or controlling principle based on 
community standards of decency and fairness that underlies 
and informs the substantive law of contract.  It finds 
expression in various technical rules and doctrines, defines 
their form, content and field of application and provides them 
with a moral and theoretical foundation.  Good faith thus has 
 
 33 ibid 13H. 
 34 Zimmermann, “Good Faith and Equity” (n 7) 258-60; Hutchison, “Good 
faith in the SA law of contract” (n 7) 222-26. See also the discussion of Barkhuizen (n 
7) which follows in part II.B below. 
 35 Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 (4) SA 302 
(SCA), see the minority judgment of Olivier JA; Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust 2000 
(1) SA 315 (C); Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 (1) SA 464 (C); Miller & Another 
NNO v Dannecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C). 
 36 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). The “Appellate Division” was 
rebranded the “Supreme Court of Appeal” under the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. 
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a creative, a controlling and a legitimating or explanatory 
function.  It is not, however, the only value or principle that 
underlies the law of contract;  nor, perhaps, even the most 
important one.37 
The Brisley case concerned a non-variation clause in a 
contract of residential lease.  One of the terms entrenched 
thereby was a right of the landlord to terminate the contract for 
late payment of the rent.  In the subsequent eviction 
proceedings, the defendant tenant alleged that the plaintiff 
landlord had orally agreed to a variation of the due date for 
payment and that he was as a result acting in bad faith in 
relying on the non-variation clause in the contract (which 
required all variations to be in writing and signed by both 
parties).  This argument was dismissed by the SCA and an 
eviction order was made:38 the argument based on good faith, 
as quoted above, proved unsuccessful.39  A string of 
conservative decisions followed from the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, confirming that good faith was only an underlying 
value and not a ground on which to attack contractual 
conduct.40  At the time, the Supreme Court of Appeal was the 
apex court in commercial (that is, non-constitutional) matters.41   
 
 37 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [22].  Here the court cited with approval D. Hutchison, 
“Non-variation clauses: any escape from the Shifren straitjacket?” (2001) 118  SALJ 
720, 744.   
 38 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [46]-[47]. 
 39 ibid [11]-[34]. 
 40 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); South African Forestry 
Co Ltd v York Timber Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA); Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA); African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams 
Travel and Tours CC and Others 2011 (3) SA 511 (SCA); Potgieter v Potgieter NO and 
Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA). 
 41 Since the enactment of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, in 
force since August 2013, the Constitutional Court is now the apex court in all matters.  
Prior to this, parties had to raise a constitutional argument in order for the 
Constitutional Court to exercise jurisdiction over a claim.  For judicial discussion, see 
Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC) [12]-[19]. 
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B.  The Constitutionalisation of Contract Law42 
In the light of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
conservative stance in the early to mid- 2000s, it remained to be 
seen how the Constitutional Court would approach the 
common law of contract, given its mandate of transformative 
constitutionalism.  The Barkhuizen v Napier decision handed 
down in 2007 was the first Constitutional Court pronouncement 
on this issue.43  The case dealt with a challenge to a contract term 
perceived to be an infringement of a constitutional right.  This 
term reflected a 90-day time bar clause in an indemnity 
insurance contract entered into between an insurer and a 
natural person.  The challenge rested on the constitutionally 
enshrined right of access to a court.  After much discussion, the 
majority dismissed the challenge on the basis of insufficient 
evidence.44  Barkhuizen remains fundamental in modern South 
African contract law, however, since it set the blueprint as to 
how to test the validity of contract terms, or the enforcement 
thereof, against the Constitution.45   
Following Barkhuizen, constitutional rights in South 
Africa apply through a process of indirect horizontality to 
contracts: public policy is the vehicle which intermediates the 
application of the Bill of Rights, setting up a doctrine akin to 
unconscionability: 
 
 42 By this concept I intend to describe the process by which the South African 
law of contract is being developed to better give effect to the rights in the Bill of 
Rights, as well as related underlying constitutional values (such as ubuntu).  The 
South African Bill of Rights is horizontally applicable, albeit indirectly, and includes 
socio-economic rights in addition to the conventional civil and political rights.  The 
resultant construct is a judicially ‘transformed’ law of contract, hence 
‘constitutionalisation of contract law’ and ‘constitutional contract law’.  Further 
details appear in what follows. 
 43 Barkhuizen (n 7). 
 44 ibid [84]-[89]. 
 45 This key additional element of a judicial discretion not to enforce otherwise 
acceptable contracts is discussed in ibid [56]. 
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Ordinarily, constitutional challenges to contractual terms will 
give rise to the question of whether the disputed provision is 
contrary to public policy.  Public policy represents the legal 
convictions of the community; it represents those values that 
are held most dear by the society.  …Since the advent of our 
constitutional democracy, public policy is now deeply rooted 
in our Constitution and the values which underlie it.46 
This role for an unconscionability (or even just fairness) 
rule on the basis of which to determine contractual disputes 
adds another layer of complexity to the question of good faith 
in contract law: the constitutionally informed notion of public 
policy takes up most of the available space in the standard-
setting process for contractual behaviour. What additional role 
good faith can play remains a little uncertain, outside of the 
limited default position described above.47  With some 
circumspection, the majority judgment held as follows on the 
question of good faith: 
The requirement of good faith is not unknown in our common 
law of contract.  It underlies contractual relations in our law. 
…As the law currently stands, good faith is not a self-standing 
rule, but an underlying value that is given expression through 
existing rules of law.  In this instance, good faith is given effect 
to by the existing common law rule that contractual clauses 
that are impossible to comply with should not be enforced.  To 
put it differently: “Good faith . . . has a creative, a controlling 
and a legitimating or explanatory function.  It is not, however, 
the only value or principle that underlies the law of 
contracts.”  Whether, under the Constitution, this limited role 
for good faith is appropriate …to give effect to the value of 
 
 46 ibid [28]. See further L.F. Van Huyssteen, G.F. Lubbe & M.F.B. Reinecke, 
Contract: General Principles (5th edn, Juta 2016) 11-18. 
 47 As part of this process, good faith would also underlie the application of the 
public policy rule.  See Hutchison, “Good faith in the SA law of contract” (n 7) 222-
26. 
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good faith are, fortunately, not questions that need be 
answered on the facts of this case and I refrain from doing so.48 
Several other cases from the Constitutional Court have 
followed, establishing a line of constitutional contract law 
decisions.49  Most of these concerned statutes protecting weaker 
parties,50 or specific areas of contracting, such as commercial 
credit agreements51 and agency.52  There has been a great deal 
of transformative emphasis in this line of cases, but the exact 
status of the common law duty of good faith remains clouded.   
Another detailed discussion of good faith in contract 
from this subsequent line of cases is the decision in Botha v Rich 
NO.53  The case concerned an action for transfer of immovable 
property by a plaintiff who had entered into an agreement to 
purchase that property on instalments.  This was a situation 
which the Alienation of Land Act54 expressly addressed.55  The 
plaintiff buyer had paid enough instalments to demand transfer 
in terms of the statute, but the defendant trust alleged that it 
had validly cancelled the contract at a prior date.  The 
Constitutional Court ordered transfer of the property, thereby 
overturning the cancellation, but also granted a reciprocal 
remedy to the seller to withhold transfer until a mortgage had 
 
 48 Barkhuizen (n 7) [80]-[82] (edited and footnotes removed).   
 49 See the list of cases in (n 21) above. 
 50 See eg Nkata v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2016 (4) SA 257 (CC) on the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC) 
on the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999; Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 (4) SA 474 
(CC) on the Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998. 
 51 Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC), which 
concerned the in duplum rule (which places a cap on the extent to which interest may 
accrue on an outstanding capital debt). 
 52 Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC), which concerned ostensible 
authority in the law of agency. 
 53 Botha (n 21). 
 54 Act 68 of 1981. 
 55 See ibid section 27. 
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been registered over the land in its favour.56  In discussing 
reciprocity and its links to good faith, the court said the 
following: 
[T]he concepts of justice, reasonableness and fairness 
historically constituted good faith in contract.  The principle 
of reciprocity originated in these notions.  …Bilateral 
contracts are almost invariably cooperative ventures where 
two parties have reached a deal involving performances by 
each in order to benefit both.  Honouring that contract cannot 
therefore be a matter of each side pursuing his or her own self-
interest without regard to the other party’s interests.  Good 
faith is the lens through which we come to understand 
contracts in that way.  In this case, good faith is given 
expression through the principle of reciprocity…57  
C.  Indigenous Law 
As to diversity and the role of indigenous law and 
values, the original Barkhuizen decision included reference to 
indigenous law by employing the South African value of 
ubuntu, but as part of the definition of public policy, rather than 
good faith: 
Notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness 
cannot be separated from public policy.  Public policy takes 
into account the necessity to do simple justice between 
individuals.  Public policy is informed by the concept of 
ubuntu.58  
Ubuntu was listed as a constitutional value in the interim 
Constitution, which was in force during the transition to 
democracy in South Africa, prior to the final Constitution 
 
 56 Botha (n 21) [47]-[49]. 
 57 Botha (n 21) [45]-[46]. 
 58 Barkhuizen (n 7) [51]. 
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coming into force.59  Reference to the concept was omitted from 
the final Constitution, however.60  Nevertheless, ubuntu crops 
up time and again in Constitutional Court judgments and has 
been used in several different areas of the law, such as: criminal 
law (outlawing the death penalty),61 defamation (in a dissenting 
judgment, arguing for an apology to serve as a remedy),62 and 
(as above) in contract.63  A general definition of the concept has 
been offered at various times by both scholars and the 
judiciary.64  Emeritus Constitutional Court justice Mokoro 
defined the concept in an often quoted article (written in her 
personal capacity) with reference to a traditional South African 
saying, “ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”, which she translates as 
“a human being is a human being through other human 
beings”.65  Mokgoro adds further: “the individual’s existence 
and well-being are relative to the group”.66   
Ubuntu in contract law was controversially discussed by 
the Constitutional Court in Everfresh in 2011.67  There a landlord 
sought the eviction of a tenant from commercial premises.  The 
original contract of lease had included a right of renewal for a 
 
 59 “Postamble” to Act 200 of 1993. 
 60 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  See T.W. Bennett, 
‘Ubuntu: An African Equity’ in F. Diedrich (ed), Ubuntu, Good Faith & Equity (Juta 
2011) 3, 5. 
 61 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
 62 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC). See the separate minority judgments 
of Mokgoro J [68]-[70] and Sachs J [105]-[121]. 
 63 For an inventory of the uses of this concept see H. Keep & R. Midgley, “The 
Emerging Role of ‘Ubuntu-Botho in Developing a Consensual South African Legal 
Culture” in F. Bruisma and D. Nelken (eds), Explorations of Legal Cultures (Elsevier 
2007) 29. 
 64 See eg Everfresh (n 12) [71] (discussed below); Y. Mokgoro, “Ubuntu and the 
Law in South Africa” (1998) 4  BHRLR15; D. Cornell & N. Muvangua (eds), Ubuntu 
and the Law ( Fordham University Press 2012); Diedrich, Ubuntu, Good Faith & Equity 
(n 60); T. Bennett, Ubuntu: An African Jurisprudence (Juta 2018).   
 65 Mokgoro, “Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa” (n 64) 15-16. 
 66 ibid 16. 
 67 Everfresh (n 12) [71]-[72]. 
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further term, subject to agreement on the appropriate rental.  
The tenant argued that this clause imposed a duty on the 
landlord to negotiate the rental amount with it, and that this 
duty was based in good faith and required a constitutionally 
informed development of the common law.68  The tenant was 
unsuccessful in the High Court with this argument, and leave 
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was denied.69  The 
Constitutional Court agreed to hear the matter, but leave to 
appeal was in the end denied there by the majority too, on the 
basis that a defence based on the constitutional development of 
the common law was raised in that court for the first time.70  
Despite dismissing the appeal, the majority made several strong 
obiter statements that they felt that there may indeed be a duty 
to negotiate here and that this would be based on ubuntu.71  
They offered the following definition of ubuntu to serve in this 
contractual context:  
Indeed, it is highly desirable and in fact necessary to infuse 
the law of contract with constitutional values, including 
values of ubuntu, which inspire much of our constitutional 
compact. On a number of occasions in the past this Court has 
had regard to the meaning and content of the concept of 
ubuntu. It emphasises the communal nature of society and 
“carries in it the ideas of humaneness, social justice and 
fairness” and envelopes “the key values of group solidarity, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic 
norms and collective unity”.72 
This decision caused much angst in commercial circles, 
as it seemed to undermine settled practice that agreements to 
agree were unenforceable on the ground that they lacked 
 
 68 ibid [13]-[16]. 
 69 ibid [10]-[12]. 
 70 ibid [63]-[67]. 
 71 ibid [71]-[72]. 
 72 ibid [71] (Moseneke J). 
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certainty (unless a deadlock-breaking mechanism such as an 
arbitration clause was inserted).73  To compound this angst, the 
term “ubuntu” seemed to many commercial practitioners to be 
too broad and vague to allow for clients to be advised ex ante.74   
D.  The Status Quo 
Where does that leave the notional concept of fair 
dealing and appropriate contractual behaviour in positive 
South African law?  The answer is in a state of flux.  There 
appear to be varying judicial interpretations of the current law, 
possibly due to the seemingly broad powers of judicial 
discretion created by the Constitutional Court’s 
pronouncements thus far.75  At High Court level, there are 
several instances reported in the last two years of the 
Constitutional Court’s position being interpreted as a licence to 
exercise a blanket judicial discretion on equitable grounds.  In 
the 2017-2018 period, I have been able to source four such 
reported decisions,76 of which I will discuss one in particular: 
Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings.77   
 
 73 Wallis, “Commercial Certainty and Constitutionalism” (n 19) 557-61. 
 74 ibid 560.  Wallis’s argument here is general: he asks what role the definition 
of ubuntu cited in Everfresh above can have in framing a relationship between 
artificial persons. 
 75 For published opinions supporting this view, the personal writing of certain 
Supreme Court of Appeal justices refers: Wallis, “Commercial Certainty and 
Constitutionalism”; F.D.J. Brand, “The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the 
South African law of contract: A Further Instalment” (2016) 27 Stellenbosch L R 238; 
C. Lewis, “The uneven journey to uncertainty in contract” 2013 (76) THRHR 80. 
 76 Bondev Midrand (Pty) Ltd v Madzhie and Others 2017 (4) SA 166 (GP); 
Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2017 (4) 
SA 243 (GJ); Roazar CC v The Falls Supermarket CC 2017 (2) All SA 665 (GJ); Beadica 231 
CC v The Trustees for the Time Being of the Oregon Trust (IT728/1995)2018 (1) SA 549 
(WCC). 
 77 Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 
2017 (4) SA 243 (GJ). 
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In Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings, the applicant landlord 
had exercised a contractual right to cancel a commercial lease 
due to the late payment of rent and sought eviction of the tenant 
as a consequence thereof.  In brief, the facts were that the tenant, 
Southern Sun, was operating an hotel business in a building 
owned by the landlord, Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings.  Rent 
was due by the seventh day of each month and the contract 
contained an express cancellation clause permitting the 
landlord to terminate the contract in the event of late payment 
of the rent.  The tenant paid late in June 2014, through an error 
of its bank alone and in circumstances where there was no 
shortage of available funds.  As soon as the error was 
discovered, the tenant immediately instructed its bank to pay 
the landlord.  The landlord accepted the late payment, but 
advised the tenant in writing that a future late payment would 
be met with immediate cancellation of the contract.  In July, 
August, and September, the tenant monitored its account 
closely and payment was in each case made on time.  In 
October, however, rent was again not paid by the due date, a 
fact which went undetected by the tenant.  The landlord 
thereafter gave notice in writing to the tenant that it had 
cancelled the contract.  The tenant immediately tendered 
payment in full plus interest, but this was rejected by the 
landlord.  
In the High Court it was held that this was a situation of 
“demonstrable unfairness”78 to the tenant and that as a result, 
the principle of sanctity of contract should be relaxed: 
Applying the value of ubuntu, “carrying with it the ideas of 
humaneness, social justice and fairness” (Everfresh para 71), to 
the facts of this matter, finally leads me to conclude that an 
order for the eviction of the respondent, as sought by the 
 
 78 ibid [35]. 
Good Faith in South Africa Printers Version 2.0 (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2019  10:39 AM 
246 JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH LAW [Vol. 1 
applicant, would offend the values of the Constitution…, and 
that the application must accordingly fail.79 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal this decision 
was overturned.80  The Supreme Court of Appeal began by 
noting that the Barkhuizen public policy test evaluated not only 
the terms of the contract itself, but also the effect thereof, which 
facilitated a more purposive approach to ensure a substantively 
fair outcome.81  Immediately thereafter the court discussed the 
importance of the principle of sanctity of contract, however.82  It 
also stressed the facts that: (a) the contract terms themselves 
were not unreasonable; (b) there was more or less an equality of 
bargaining power between the parties; and (c) that performance 
on time was not impossible: the tenant could easily have 
monitored its own bank.83  In sum, contractual sanctity had to 
outweigh a public policy-based fairness argument.84  An order 
of eviction was granted.85 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision, handed down 
by a fresh and representative bench of judges, reflects the old 
conservatism of 2002 and indeed of 1988.86  This finding will 
now bind lower court decisions unless and until the 
Constitutional Court rules otherwise and should inject a 
 
 79 ibid. 
 80 See in addition, the overturning of a similar finding at High Court level by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Roazar CC v Falls Supermarket CC [2018] 1 All SA 438 
(SCA). 
 81 Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 
2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA) 15. 
 82 ibid [22]-[27]. 
 83 ibid [28]. 
 84 ibid [28]-[31]. 
 85 ibid [33]-[34]. 
 86 None of the justices of appeal listed in note 75 above were part of the bench.  
The unanimous judgment was authored by Mathopo JA. In Roazar CC v Falls 
Supermarket CC [2018] 1 All SA 438 (SCA), the unanimous judgment, which was also 
stressed freedom of contract over fairness, was delivered by Tshiqi JA. 
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measure of legal certainty into an otherwise murky area.  Will 
the Constitutional Court adhere to this conservative 
interpretation of its judgment in Barkhuizen?  The previous track 
record of this court suggests that a legal commentator must 
navigate with caution in answering this question: a clear ruling 
by the Constitutional Court is needed and preferably sooner 
rather than later.  If the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation is confirmed, this will considerably reduce the 
scope for arguments based on fairness, ubuntu, or good faith in 
future cases.   
Regardless of the ultimate role determined for such open 
norms, however, these need to be clearly defined.  In the 
following part III I argue for a tighter and more commercially 
sensitive understanding of ubuntu in contract.  A broader 
approach to defining both ubuntu and good faith will be 
discussed further in part IV.    
III. INDIGENOUS BUSINESS VALUES: LAW IN CONTEXT 
Legal development is an especially political process in 
South Africa and in contract there are different views on the 
correct path to follow going forward.  This is true not only of 
the academic discourse, but also of reported judgments.  As 
discussed above, however, the ideological trajectory of 
transformative constitutionalism in the Constitutional Court 
has been towards protecting weaker parties.  One way of doing 
this is by imposing a duty of social responsibility onto 
contracting parties.  This could also be phrased as a role for 
community.  From an African perspective specifically, there is 
a detailed published discourse on the role of community in 
framing social norms.87  Discussion topics include so-called 
African socialism, which can be contrasted with a more 
 
 87 Compare for example K. Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical 
Reflections on the African Experience ( OUP 1997) ch 2 & 5.  In South Africa the discourse 
on ubuntu, such as in the sources cited in note 64 above refers. 
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moderate notion of community as argued for by Gyekye for 
example.88  In South Africa, the governing norm is ubuntu. 
Finding a role for community in contracting seems a far 
cry from the more individualist attitudes of the average liberal 
market economy based on the protection of private property.89  
Although both contract and economic theory have come a long 
way since the zenith of freedom of contract and laissez-faire 
market regulation, it is still a long shot to say that contract 
practice is characterised by communal solidarity in most parts 
of the world.90  Indeed, as Bhasin put it with regard to Canada, 
good faith does not comprise a duty of “fiduciary loyalty” to an 
opposing party.91  One way to resolve this perceived gap 
between “Western” and “African” norms, would be to consult 
indigenous business law to see how it reconciles the notion of 
community with the commercial needs of the marketplace.  No 
such legal discourse exists, however, at least not in South 
Africa’s written sources of law.92  Chanock’s alternative history 
of South African law suggests that the reason for this lacuna 
was the deliberate strategy by past colonial and white minority 
administrations to undermine the participation of indigenous 
Africans in the economy; except in subordinate roles, such as 
 
 88 In his Tradition and Modernity, Gyekye defends a view that African socialism 
as practiced in some African states in the post-colonial era should not be the favoured 
vehicle for the notion of community.  Gyekye prefers a more moderate view of 
community which leaves room for the individual. ibid chs 2 & 5. 
 89 cf C. Fried, Contract as Promise (2nd edn, OUP 2015). 
 90 This is despite the trajectory of the argument in P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall 
of Freedom of Contract (OUP 1979). Atiyah himself addressed the theme of 
neoliberalism in: P.S. Atiyah, “Contract Law and the New Right” in P.S. Atiyah, 
Essays on the Law of Contract (OUP 1986) 355. 
 91 Bhasin (n 8) [86]. 
 92 A perusal of the leading texts will confirm this view: although some may 
contain a chapter on contracting, these are not commercial contracts, but relate 
largely to the family or broader community. Compare for example: C. Himonga & T. 
Nhlapo (eds), African Customary Law in South Africa: Post-Apartheid and Living Law 
Perspectives (Juta 2014); C. Rautenbach & J.C. Bekker, Introduction to Legal Pluralism  
(4th edn, Durban, 2014). 
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labourers, debtors, and consumers.93  The political position of 
indigenous South Africans has changed in South Africa, but 
economically, society still remains largely stratified by race, 
with the legacy of the policies Chanock describes still very 
much present today.94  Ideologically then, there is a desire to 
transform the law to a synthesis more reflective of the heritage 
of broader South African society.95 
What I will do in the rest of this part III is to defend a 
view that despite this necessary political process towards 
developing a greater role for indigenous law and values, 
including in the commercial sphere, the development of 
contract law and other areas concerned with business activity 
should not deviate from the needs of sound commercial 
practice.  I will do this by unpacking the role of community in a 
common type of indigenous commercial structure: the popular 
economy financial mutual known here as a “stokvel”.  The 
operation of the mutual (from here on I will use the vernacular 
term stokvel) is based on contract, but is largely unregulated by 
the formal law.  First, however, I will describe a context for this 
argument. 
A.  The Popular Economy 
On the periphery of South Africa’s urban centres there is 
usually an indigenous African township (itself often a legacy of 
“spatial Apartheid”).  This type of locus has been described as 
possessing a “popular economy”: a marketplace at the 
 
 93 Chanock, The Making of SA Legal Culture (n 15).  This argument is a central 
narrative thread of the whole book, but see in particular part IV, especially chs 13-14. 
 94 From a social science perspective see for example: J. Seekings & N. Nattrass, 
Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa (Yale 2005).  For a discussion of the 
relationship between law, race and poverty, see J. Modiri, “Law’s Poverty” (2015) 18 
PELJ 224. 
 95 As an example of this zeitgeist, see Everfresh (n 12) [23], which was cited and 
discussed in part II above. 
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intersection of the formal and informal economies.96  Much 
commercial activity goes on here, largely of the informal 
variety.  From a commercial point of view, the formal sector 
penetrates the popular economy too, however, through (for 
example) interaction with formal sector retail businesses, with 
banks, with formal sector micro-lenders, with insurers, and 
through the social assistance measures provided by the State.97  
That is not the full financial picture, however, since the informal 
economy is also home to illegal loan sharks,98 various types of 
savings and credit stokvels,99 burial societies,100 spaza shops and 
other informal traders.101  Sometimes the formal and informal 
 
 96 See for an introduction: Hull & James, “Introduction: Popular Economies in 
South Africa” (n 3).  Other sources will appear in the notes below.   
 97 This interaction between the formal and informal sectors is a defining 
feature of the discourse on the popular economy.  In A. Hutchison & N. Sibanda, “A 
Living Customary Law of Commercial Contracting: Some Law-Related Hypotheses” 
(2017) 33 SAJHR 380, we unpack this feature of the relevant literature from a legal 
perspective. 
 98 Also known in South Africa as “mashonisa”: P. Mashigo, “The lending 
practices of township microlenders and their impact on the low income households 
in South Africa: A case study for Mamelodi township” (2012) 65 New Contree 23; J. 
Roth, “Spoilt for Choice: Financial Services in a South African Township” (PhD 
thesis, University of Cambridge 2004) ch 4. 
 99 For South Africa see G. Verhoef, “Informal Financial Service Institutions for 
Survival: African Women and Stokvels in Urban South Africa, 1930-1998” (2001) 2 
Enterp & Soc 259; D. James, Money from Nothing: Indebtedness and Aspiration in South 
Africa (Stanford, 2015) ch 4; W.G. Schultze, “The Origin and Legal Nature of the 
Stokvel” (Parts 1&2) (1997) 9  SA Merc LJ 18; 153; P. Mashigo & C. Schoeman, 
“Stokvels as an Instrument and Channel to Extend Credit to Poor Households in 
South Africa” (2012) 5  JEF 49.   
 100 R.J. Thomson & D.B. Posel, “The Management of Risk by Burial Societies in 
South Africa” (2002) 2 SAAJ 83. 
 101 The Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI – an independent South African 
NGO) has made this one of their special projects, see the publications on their 
website, for example: D. Webster, “‘The End of the Street?’ Informal Traders’ 
Experiences of Rights and Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg” (2015)  
<http://www.serisa.org/images/Seri_informal_traders_report_FINAL_FOR_SIG
N_OFF_2.pdf> (accessed 16 February 2018).  See further: M. Pieterse, “Rights, 
regulation and bureaucratic impact: the impact of human rights litigation on the 
regulation of informal trade in Johannesburg” 2017 (20) PELJ 1. 
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are mixed, such as when a salary earned in the formal sector is 
used as capital in an informal venture.102   
The formal sector may bring with it a set of legal norms 
and regulations laid out in a sophisticated myriad of financial 
and consumer statutes, but the legal system does not always 
completely reach into the informal economy.103  Sometimes, the 
informal financial sector is formally excluded from 
legislation.104  Then, because of issues of access to justice and 
distrust of the legal system, it is also here that indigenous 
business is carried on in a largely privately ordered system of 
norms, rather than (necessarily) according to the positive legal 
norms of the central state.105   
The South African popular economy has been the subject 
of many empirical studies by social scientists and hence there is 
a good deal of data from which to hypothesise about the content 
of ubuntu in modern indigenous commercial practice.  This 
allows for the development of a grounded theory106 of ubuntu, 
which is in my view more accurately pitched than the 
individual worldview portrayed in a curial judgment.  Of 
course, a full grounded theory would require a comprehensive 
 
 102 This issue is unpacked in Hull & James, “Introduction: Popular Economies 
in South Africa” (n 3) 7-10.   
 103 See Rautenbach & Bekker, Introduction to Legal Pluralism  (n 92)15-16, who 
refer to a concept of a “people’s law”, distinct from living customary law and the 
common law. See further G. Super, “Volatile Sovereignty: Governing Crime through 
the Community in Khayelitsha” (2016) 50 Law & Soc’y Rev 450; S. Burman & W. 
Schärf, “Creating People’s Justice: Street Committees and People’s Courts in a South 
African City” (1990) 24 Law & Soc’y Rev 693.   
 104 The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 expressly excludes from its ambit a 
“transaction between a stokvel and a member of a stokvel in accordance with the 
rules of that stokvel” in section 8(2)(c). The term “stokvel” is defined in detail in 
section 1 of that Act. 
 105 An narrative account of the social circumstances in a South African 
township, reflecting lack of access to justice and a resultant necessity for private 
ordering can be found in E. Bähre, Money and Violence (Brill 2007).   
 106 M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory 
and Practice (4th edn, Sage 2015) 98, 288-89. 
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dedicated survey, which I have not done.107  Still the available 
materials of both a qualitative108 and quantitative109 nature 
provide enough data to allow for saturation of the accounts: 
indeed certain features of these studies are recurrent, a trend 
which immediately strikes the reader thereof.  One of the 
predominant such features is the role of community in popular 
economy business practice.   
B.  An Appropriate Theory of Contracting 
First, however, we need a theory of contracting which is 
able to operate as a normative process without reference to the 
courts.  The socio-legal literature on contracting is extensive and 
provides a readily available terminology for this exercise.  
Relational contract theory has shown that the actual terms of a 
given contract, whether written or oral, are only part of the 
picture.110  A full account of a contractual relationship must also 
explain the nature and extent of the human connectivity 
between the parties, as well as their underlying economic wants 
and needs.111  Both contracts in the popular economy and in the 
formal economy are concluded through human agency; and 
economics is the driver of commercial activity.  Together these 
two additional dimensions of a contractual relation add to the 
 
 107 I am, however, in the process of conducting a localised, qualitative study of 
contracting norms in stokvels in Khayelitsha, Cape Town.   
 108 The sources in notes 98-100 above are largely qualitative. 
 109 An example of a quantitative study is the research paper by African 
Response, “Stokvels – A hidden economy: unpacking the potential of South African 
traditional savings schemes” (2012), available at: 
https://www.africanresponse.co.za/assets/press/2012StokvelHiddenEconomy.pd
f (accessed 15 February 2018). 
 110 See I.R. Macneil, “The Many Futures of Contracts” (1974) 47 S Cal L Rev 691; 
S. Macaulay, “Non-contractual Relations in Business – A Preliminary Study” (1963) 
28 Am Soc Rev 55.   
 111 This “three-dimensional” view of a contractual relation is clearly set out in 
Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP 2002) 128-32.   
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formal terms of the contract and allow for non-legal sanctions112 
to be brought to bear on a recalcitrant opposing party.  These 
may be of the social variety (such as reputational impairment) 
or of the economic kind (such as refusing to do repeat business, 
or using market leverage to force compliance).113  In the 
informal economy there is also the possibility of self-help of 
various sorts, particularly if formal sector law enforcement does 
not fully penetrate the community to prevent this.114  Through 
human interaction, underpinned by non-legal sanctions, it is 
thus possible to create a privately ordered115 system of 
contracting.   
While there might be informal community tribunals 
dispensing summary justice,116 it is largely through peer 
pressure and non-legal sanctions that compliance is achieved in 
the popular economy business realm.117  I have discussed these 
features at length in a separate article co-written with 
Sibanda.118  What I will expand upon here, however, is the role 
which community (or ubuntu) can play in this matrix.  I will do 
this through an anecdotal process, using as my example a 
common form of popular economy commercial activity, namely 
the stokvel.   
 
 112 D. Charny, “Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships” (1990-91) 
104 Harv L Rev 373. 
 113 ibid at 392-397.  See further Collins, Regulating Contracts (n 111) ch 5-6.   
 114 Roth, “Spoilt for Choice” (n 98) discusses this aspect at ch 4, with reference 
to the transaction costs involved in this process. See further Bähre, Money and Violence 
(n 105) 83-84, 132-140. 
 115 For an overview of the “private ordering” literature, see B.D. Richman, 
“Firms, Courts and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private 
Ordering” (2004) 104 Colum L Rev 2328. 
 116 See Super (n 103); Burman & Schärf (n 103); Rautenbach & Bekker, 
Introduction to Legal Pluralism (n 92) 15-16. 
 117 This was our hypothesis in Hutchison & Sibanda, “A Living Customary 
Law of Commercial Contracting” (n 97) where we applied the private ordering thesis 
to the empirical findings of popular economy scholars. 
 118 Hutchison & Sibanda, “A Living Customary Law” (n 97). 
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C.  Stokvels: Contractual Ubuntu in Action? 
There are various types of stokvel: the literature 
distinguishes “rotating savings and credit associations” 
(“ROSCAs”) (which have primarily a savings function, where 
regular contributions are made to a communal pool, which is 
then taken in turns by a member of the group according to a 
predetermined roster)119 from “accumulated savings and credit 
associations” (“ASCRAs”).  (In an ASCRA, the periodical 
individual contributions to a joint pool by each member are 
simultaneously paid out at a pre-specified maturity date.  This 
format involves saving through individual member 
contributions, along with the growth of a pool of capital.  The 
pooled resources may be increased through the lending of this 
capital to members at interest).120  The quantitative sources on 
stokvels describe a vast amount of financial resources being 
held and managed through this process, usually with a bank 
acting as a repository for safety reasons.121  The qualitative 
sources paint a picture of regular meetings, which are social 
events for participants and which allow for a public monitoring 
process to ensure payment of contributions and to police 
compliance with the rules of the association.122   
A transaction between a stokvel and a member of that 
stokvel is expressly exempted from the National Credit Act, 
hence the practices of these associations remain largely 
 
 119 Another way of looking at this construct is that an interest free loan is 
provided to each group member (except the last member of the rotation).  This is one 
reason why this format is chosen over individual savings in a bank account. 
 120 For definitions of the stokvel concept and typologies, see Verhoef, “Informal 
Financial Service Institutions” (n 99); Schultze, “The Origin and Legal Nature of the 
Stokvel” (n 99) 25-26; Mashigo & Schoeman, “Stokvels” (n 99) 54-56. For a reported 
South African case describing the functioning of an ASCRA, see Mndi v Malgas 2006 
(2) SA 182 (E).   
 121 African Response, “Stokvels – A Hidden Economy” (n 109) 6. 
 122 Verhoef, “Informal Financial Service Institutions” (n 99) 263-64, 73-74; 
Schultze, “The Origin and Legal Nature of the Stokvel” (n 99) 25. 
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unregulated.123  This means that compliance with the rules of 
the stokvel must be ensured through non-legal means.  Here the 
sources speak to the heavy weight attached to reputation in a 
group whose members are screened before joining by existing 
participants, and who are usually well known to one another as 
members of the same community.124  Default will lead to a loss 
of face in the community; an end to a line of available credit; 
and possibly also (illegal) forms of self-help debt execution by 
the group.125 
What role does community play here then?  The 
advantage of membership of a stokvel is that a stokvel will 
extend credit to a community member when she needs it – for 
school fees, funeral costs, or other unanticipated 
expenditures.126  This services a need for micro-loans for those 
who may have an impaired credit record in the formal sector, 
or insufficient resources to obtain a loan from a formal sector 
bank restrained by the rules of the National Credit Act, which 
prohibit reckless lending.127  This is a very important role for 
community, and indeed one could possibly label this ubuntu if 
one was of an ideological slant.  Bähre speaks strongly against 
using the term ubuntu, however: his anthropological study 
found that compliance was achieved through communal 
mechanisms, which rested on monitoring and social pressure.128  
A concept of ubuntu in the sense of altruistic permissiveness or 
 
 123 Act 34 of 2005, section 8(2)(c). 
 124 Verhoef, “Informal Financial Service Institutions”(n 99) 263; Mashigo & 
Schoeman, “Stokvels” (n 99) 57.  For an anecdotal, empirical account, see James, 
Money from Nothing (n 99) ch 4. 
 125 Bähre, Money and Violence(n 105) 132-33. cf Verhoef, “Informal Financial 
Service Institutions” (n 99) 264, 274-275. 
 126 Bähre, Money and Violence (n 105) 136. 
 127 Reckless credit is regulated in chapter 4 part D of the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005. 
 128 Bähre, Money and Violence (n 105) 133-40. 
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trust was not supported by his empirical findings.129  His 
account, supported by the omission of the term “ubuntu” in 
other similar anthropological studies, speaks to the fact that 
contracts are expected to be upheld, despite the communal 
setting.  The community will help you in your time of need with 
a loan when no one else will offer you this, but default on the 
loan will have personal consequences for you as debtor, since 
this impacts on the financial position of other group 
members.130 
Is this moderate community as per Gyekye: private 
property backed individualism, but tempered by social 
responsibility?131  Perhaps, but it is also a survivalist account of 
a largely self-sustaining group which cannot afford to write off 
debts.  In the same sense of community, sometimes the financial 
well-being of the majority of the group must outweigh the 
personal misfortunes of an individual debtor.132  Also we are 
laying the foundations for profit-maximising individualist 
behaviour, although within the confines of a collective 
enterprise.  In short, we are seeing that the community supplies 
resources to fill in for the failures of the state-sanctioned system, 
and self-regulates the allocation thereof.  In my view, the 
stokvel provides an illustration of Gyekye’s theory of moderate 
community through its example of individualism within a 
collective structure.  We also see here a form of ubuntu which 
fits the business mould, rather than a utopian ideology which 
has largely been abstracted from the conventional market forces 
of commercial reality. 
 
 129 ibid. 
 130 Bähre, Money and Violence (n 105) 132-33, 136-40. Compare Verhoef, 
“Informal Financial Service”(n 99) 272, who also states that there are sanctions for 
non-compliance, but describes the overall system as one of ubuntu. 
 131 Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity (n 87) ch 2. 
 132 Compare here the statement of Mokgoro cited above in the text attached to 
note 66 that individual well-being is relative to that of the group. 
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D.  A Role for Context? 
I return now to a question posed in the introduction 
above: do the same business norms apply in the Johannesburg 
boardroom as apply at the Khayelitsha133 stokvel’s monthly 
gathering?  Does fair dealing and appropriate business conduct 
transpose seamlessly from one setting to the next?  Again, I will 
draw on relational contract theory to answer this question.  
Campbell argued in 2014, after good faith in contract was firmly 
raised in the English jurisdiction, that if there was to be a duty 
of good faith, it should be given content with regard to the 
context of the parties’ own business dealings, rather than with 
reference to an exogenous standard.134  I myself have argued 
separately that the Constitutional Court’s approach to contract 
dispute resolution is best analysed through a contextual 
approach: this allows for a sufficiently nuanced interpretation 
of an often seemingly ad hoc and particularist decision making 
record.135  Contextual reasoning also goes to the heart of the 
substance over form debate, which has long animated 
discussions of the protection of weaker parties in contract.136  In 
the same way that studying ubuntu in context allows us to 
define accurately what this notion means for business conduct 
in the South African popular economy, one should not forget 
that ubuntu is also at heart about community, and abstracted 
from a community setting, ubuntu loses much of its meaning.  
 
 133 Khayelitsha is a large township (see note 11 above) 30km outside Cape 
Town.  The population thereof comprises mostly indigenous Africans.  Khayelitsha 
is the location of my own qualitative empirical study, which is currently in progress. 
 134 D. Campbell, “Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the ‘Relational Contract’” 
(2014) 77 MLR 475, 488, 490-492. 
 135 A. Hutchison, “Relational theory, context and commercial common sense: 
views on contract interpretation and adjudication” (2017) 134  SALJ 296. 
 136 The key text here is D. Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication” (1975-1976) 89 Harv L Rev 1685.  For a South African perspective, see 
A. Cockrell, “Substance and Form in the South African Law of Contract” (1992) 109  
SALJ 40. 
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If ubuntu informs public policy, itself a conception of 
notional community standards, then we are simply redefining 
who the notional South African community is, or rebranding 
the concept under an indigenous label.137  If, however, ubuntu 
is intended to convey a positive standard of fair dealing beyond 
this, to which a party’s conduct at all stages of the contracting 
process must conform and on which grounds an independent 
challenge not just to the contract terms, but also to the conduct 
of a party or the process of contracting, then it should not be 
forgotten that contracting happens in different contexts 
between different types of parties.  Indeed, this is the founding 
philosophy behind statutes protecting weaker parties in specific 
contexts, namely that different kinds of contract law are needed.  
Perhaps as I suggested with Sibanda, we need an additional 
contract regime dealing specifically with indigenous contract 
forms,138 or perhaps such a system of norms could be included 
in the existing statutory matrix.139   
In the Johannesburg boardroom, however, we are likely 
to find an arms-length transaction between corporates: 
probably negotiated with legal representation and possibly 
backed by insurance or collateral of various kinds.  If there is a 
dispute here, it will probably be resolved with reference to the 
central State-sanctioned legal regime.   Should the same 
standards of market conduct apply as in a system of contracting 
resting on community-backed private ordering for its 
existence?  One might add the question: who is your notional 
indigenous “African”?  There are many different types of 
people in South Africa, a fact long recognised in constitutional 
 
 137 cf Bennett, “Ubuntu: An African Equity” (n 60) 16-19. 
 138 Hutchison & Sibanda, “A Living Customary Law” (n 97) 403.   
 139 Of course, this suggestion ignores various problematic attempts at 
codifying indigenous law in South, see for example S. Mnisi Weeks & A. Claassens, 
“Tensions between vernacular values that prioritise basic needs and State versions 
of customary law that contradict them: ‘We love these fields that feed us, but not at 
the expense of a person’” (2011) 22  Stellenbosch L R 823. 
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indigenous law.140  To ascribe one universal “African 
worldview” to all members of the business community in South 
Africa sounds a lot like a generalisation, perhaps even cultural 
relativism.   
In the following part IV, I will address the question as to 
what a market conduct norm should entail.  
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: DEFINING A DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
IN CONTRACT 
A.  Good Faith in Bhasin 
From a South African perspective, perhaps the most 
useful aspect of the Bhasin decision is the level of detail in which 
the role of good faith in contract was unpacked by the Supreme 
Court.  Spanning just over 60 paragraphs of the judgment, good 
faith is explained in the light of previous Canadian decisions, 
comparative law, statute law, and academic writing.  
Proceeding from a summarised claim (which I will repeat) that 
good faith is an organising principle, which underlies other 
areas of contract law and which has as a minimum core a 
standard of honest conduct in the performance of contractual 
obligations,141 the judgment goes on to explain the context of the 
operation of this doctrine in Canadian law fully.  This bold 
decision will now aid the development of the law of good faith 
in contract moving forward.142  The Bhasin findings on good 
 
 140 There a given rule of the “living” customary law may be proven with regard 
to a particular community where that norm has force of law in a legal pluralism 
sense.  See: Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 
460 (CC) [53]; Bhe and Others v Magistrate , Khayelitsha , and Others (Commission for 
Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human 
Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) [153].   
 141 Bhasin  (n 8) [33]. 
 142 The academic reception of Bhasin has been mixed in Canada: J. McCamus, 
“The New General ‘Principle’ of Good Faith Performance and the New ‘Rule’ of 
Honesty in Performance in Canadian Contract Law” (2015) 32  JCL 103, 118 describes 
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faith may be summed up in a few broad propositions to 
facilitate comparison with South African law in framing a 
market conduct standard in contract: 
(a)  Good faith underlies many elements of modern 
contract law.  It is given effect to through (inter alia) the doctrine 
of unconscionability; the process of interpretation; and the 
implication of terms.143  These three processes address power 
imbalances between contracting parties.144 
(b)  Good faith also operates as part of the specific rules 
surrounding certain classes of contracts, in areas such as: 
insurance; franchises; employment law; and in tendering 
processes.145  Here there may be additional duties due to the 
nature of the contracting process. 
(c)  Certain contracting contexts (outside of these areas) 
call for a more nuanced treatment of the duty of good faith, such 
as: express terms promising cooperation between parties;146 the 
fettering of the exercise of a discretionary contractual power 
assigned to a party;147 and where one party seeks to evade 
contractual duties.148   
 
the case as an “important milestone in the development of the Canadian common 
law of contract”.  A. Swan, “The Obligation to Perform in Good Faith: Comment on 
Bhasin v Hrynew” (2015) 56 Can Bus LJ 395 is also positive and argues that the 
decision is fairly simple to comply with – contracting parties should not tell each 
other lies, or sail too close to the wind in contractual dealings. J. Robertson, “Good 
Faith as an Organizing Principle in Contract Law: Bhasin v Hrynew – Two Steps 
Forward and One Look Back” (2015) 93 Can Bar Rev 809, 860-864 finds a duty of 
honest performance of contracts to be a development, which is “hardly surprising”, 
although he disputes the correctness of the way in which this duty was applied to 
the evidence before the court.  A more negative view may be found in C. Hunt, “Good 
Faith Performance in Canadian Contract Law” (2015) 74 Cambridge LJ 4, 6 who 
laments the potential inroad into freedom of contract. 
 143 Bhasin (n 8) [42]-[45]. 
 144 ibid [43]. 
 145 ibid [46], [53]-[56]. 
 146 ibid [49]. 
 147 ibid [50]. 
 148 ibid [51]. 
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(d)  The context of a contractual relation is extremely 
important in giving content to a duty of good faith in a given 
situation.149  Any duties imposed should be drawn from the 
nature of the relationship between the parties.150 
(e)  In general terms, good faith in the performance of a 
contract requires only honest conduct from a party.151  It does 
not require that party to put her opponent’s interests ahead of 
her own as per fiduciary duties.152  Thus, for example, there is 
no requirement of disclosure beyond those provided for in 
specific contexts such as insurance law.153   
(f)  The recognition of a duty of good faith performance 
provides a basis on which to attack contractual conduct.154  This 
is by means of a rule of contract law, not through the 
implication of terms.155 
(g)  Freedom of contract is another very important 
underlying contractual value, as is contractual certainty.156  A 
blanket discretion to decide cases on an ad hoc basis should not 
be given to judges.   
Another appealing aspect of the Bhasin decision is its 
incrementalism, true to the Common law mould.  The 
propositions above define a role for good faith conduct; yet do 
so largely with reference to certain particular contexts.  A broad 
general duty of good faith outside of context-defined situations 
is kept to the bare minimum of honesty in performance.  
Honesty is an easily defensible minimum standard, in line with 
the phrase used elsewhere in the judgment of “appropriate 
 
 149 ibid [69]. 
 150 ibid [69], [77]-[78]. 
 151 ibid [79]-[82]. 
 152 ibid [86]. 
 153 ibid. 
 154 ibid [88]. 
 155 ibid [74]-[76]. 
 156 ibid [70]-[71]. 
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regard for the other party’s interests”.157  It is certainly not a 
duty of altruism, nor one of objective reasonableness.  With 
regard to a role for community: this is given effect to through 
the use of context, including the relational aspect thereof.158  It 
is also a standard of community which will underlie the rule 
prohibiting unconscionable conduct.159  This role for 
community values leaves room for a given context to require 
more from a contracting party, while not imposing an 
unrealistic burden in adversarial commercial settings.  One 
might indeed say that honesty is the minimum standard which 
the notion of community imparts in Canada, and that this 
standard cuts across different categories and contexts of 
contractual relation. 
B.  A Uniquely South African Perspective: Comparative Analysis 
The South African analysis will deal with the two major 
propositions of Bhasin under separate headings, namely (IV.B.1) 
“Good faith as organising principle”; and then (IV.B.2) “Where 
to peg a standard of good faith?”  By splitting these issues, I am 
able to provide a functionalist160 comparative account, 
particularly with regard to heading two where South African 
law speaks with several voices.   
1.  Good faith as an underlying value in South African contract law 
The statement that good faith underlies the technical 
rules of contract law and is given effect to through their 
 
 157 ibid [65], [69]. 
 158 ibid [60]-[61], [69]. 
 159 The standard referred to in Bhasin (n 8) [43] is one of “fairness”, but this 
must be determined on policy grounds, which implies a discretion based on 
community standards. 
 160 The classic proponents of this approach are K. Zweigert & H. Kötz, An 
Introduction to Comparative Law (T. Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998).  See in particular ch 
3 on their methodology. 
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interpolation is equally true of South African law as it is of 
Canadian law, as reflected in the various dicta cited in part II 
above.  Good faith is similarly used to interpret contracts161 and 
in the implication of terms.162  A related general role for good 
faith is as a doctrinal peg on which to hang new legal 
developments.163  This reflects the Civilian technique of legal 
development,164 and also indeed the Supreme Court’s approach 
in Bhasin.165  The unconscionability rule in South African law 
has also been discussed in detail in part II above.  The 
Constitutional Court has said that the public policy 
unconscionability test is informed by ubuntu, rather than good 
faith per se.  There is a conceptual overlap between good faith 
and ubuntu here, which I will unpack in the following part 
IV.B.2 below.   
With regard to specific contracts: here we enter the realm 
of various detailed statutory and common law regimes – there 
is a clear role for good faith here, not only in insurance law (as 
is universal),166 but also in the detailed “fairness” regimes 
 
 161 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) [32]-
[36] is a key recent example. 
 162 See in particular Tucker’s Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 
1980 (1) SA 645 (A) 651E-F.  The supplementing of contracts with new terms implied 
by law is discussed in Hutchison, “Good faith in the SA law of contract” (n 7) 234-36. 
 163 Compare the discussion and examples given in Zimmermann, “Good Faith 
and Equity” (n 7). 
 164 Whittaker & Zimmermann, “Good faith in European contract law: 
surveying the legal landscape” (n 4) 22-26. 
 165 Bhasin (n 8) [73]: “Recognizing a duty of honest performance flowing 
directly from the common law organizing principle of good faith is a modest, 
incremental step.”  
 166 Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 (1) SA 419 
(A); Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 431H-433F. 
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governing employment,167 residential leases,168 contracts 
between a business and a consumer,169 or contracts between 
creditors and consumer debtors.170  In these statutory regimes, 
fairness must be both substantive and procedural: there is thus 
a clearly defined ambit of acceptable market conduct, but this is 
different to a general duty of good faith in contracting.  
Outside of specific classes of contract, as in Canadian 
law, there are general rules on certain types of contractual 
clause.  Examples would be clauses creating agreements to 
agree over open terms (the Everfresh case discussed in part II 
above is an example of this).171  Sometimes this type of clause 
expressly states that the open term is to be “negotiated in good 
faith” at a future date.172  More puzzling are terms which 
expressly call for a duty of “co-operation” or “good faith” in the 
future performance of a contract: one High Court example 
dealing with a franchise relationship interpreted this clause as 
imposing a fiduciary duty on a franchisor not to infringe on the 
geographical radius of a franchisee.173  This case may, however, 
 
 167 See in particular Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, at 
section 23; Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 chapter VIII (“Unfair Dismissals and 
Unfair Labour Practices”).  For further discussion, see D. du Toit et al., Labour 
Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide (6th edn, Lexis Nexis 2015) ch 8-9. 
 168 The Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 seeks to regulate “unfair practice” in 
residential leases. This term is defined in section 1 and is used throughout the Act. 
 169 Chapter 2 part G of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 gives a 
consumer the right to “fair, just, and reasonable terms and conditions” in contractual 
relations subject to the Act. 
 170 The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 creates a detailed system of rights for 
consumer debtors, as well as prescribing procedures for debt “enforcement” and 
repossession of goods sold on credit. The Act also creates for the first time in South 
Africa a procedure whereby “over-indebted” consumers may have their debts 
restructured.   
 171 See eg Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 (2) SA 202 
(SCA). 
 172 Compare the clause cited in ibid [3]. 
 173 Silent Pond Investments CC v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 2011 6 SA 343 (D). For 
discussion of this type of clause with reference to both South African and English 
law, see T. Boxall, A. Hutchison & M. Wright, “NEC3ECC Clause 10.1: An 
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be an outlier, as I have argued elsewhere.174  A final example is 
the clause creating a discretionary contractual power, 
particularly the power to determine the performance of an 
opposing party during the subsequent course of a contractual 
relation.  The prevailing common law position here is that such 
a power must be exercised rationally, as is the case in English 
law.175  This South African standard of rationality is derived 
from Roman law, and is reflected in the phrase: arbitrium boni 
viri.176  This fetters, for example, the unilateral power of a bank 
to change an interest rate under a mortgage agreement.177  More 
controversially, Price and I have argued that South Africa seems 
to be heading in a direction of fettering on the basis of objective 
reasonableness.178  An example we used was the overturning of 
an otherwise seemingly valid cancellation of a contract in Botha 
v Rich NO (discussed in part II above).179 
The above sample are examples of the use of a good faith 
standard to underpin other technical rules of contract law in 
South Africa, which reinforces the statement to this effect by the 
Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen.180  Thus to a South African 
 
Enforceable Contractual Duty of Trust and Co-operation in the Construction 
Industry?” (2017) 28  Stellenbosch L R 97. 
 174 ibid 110-111, 113-114. 
 175 For discussion, see A. Cockrell, “Second-Guessing the Exercise of 
Contractual Power on Rationality Grounds” (1997) Acta Juridica 26, 32-34; A. Price & 
A. Hutchison, “Judicial review of exercises of contractual power: South Africa’s 
divergence from the common law tradition” (2015) 79 Rabels Zeitung 822, 835-838. 
 176 This translates as “according to the judgment of a good man”, or more 
loosely as “according to a reasonable decision”. NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River 
Drive CC and Others; Deeb and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of 
SA Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) [25]. See further Cockrell, “Second Guessing” (n 175) 
32-34; Price & Hutchison, “Judicial Review” (n 175) 835-38. 
 177 This was the finding in NBS Boland Bank v One Berg River Drive CC and Others 
1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA).  For a very similar UK case, see Paragon Finance PLC v Nash 
[2001] EWCA Civ 1466. 
 178 Price & Hutchison, “Judicial Review” (n 175) 843-44. 
 179 Botha (n 21) [50]-[51].   
 180 Barkhuizen (n 7) [82]. 
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reader, the concept of an organising principle as used by the 
Canadian Supreme Court came as no surprise and indeed made 
logical sense.  What is more controversial in South Africa, 
however, is where to peg the good faith standard.  I will discuss 
this normative question next. 
2. Where to peg a standard of good faith (or ubuntu)? 
Good faith is a concept usually best defined by example, 
as I have done in the previous part IV.B.1 above.  The overview 
provided there also demonstrates that the functional 
equivalents of the concrete manifestations of a specific duty of 
good faith in the Canadian Common law are also to be found in 
the South African law of contract.   
But what normative standard does good faith impart?  In 
part II above, I quoted several examples of judicial dicta of 
recent times which suggest abstract answers to this question.  
The South African case law discussions of good faith are 
typically briefer and vaguer than that of Bhasin, or of the English 
case of Yam Seng.181  Because of the Roman Dutch law origins of 
the South African system, all contracts are by historical 
definition based on good faith, so that the doctrine is much less 
controversial.  But that does not answer the question of where 
to peg the normative standard.  Does South African law go 
beyond a standard of honest performance alone into further 
realms of reasonableness, or perhaps even communal 
solidarity?  Here we run into the difficulty of overlapping 
conceptual terminology. 
Good faith in a basic sense of rationally defensible 
conduct which is not arbitrary and is not motivated by bad faith 
or fraud (or in the positive sense is “honest”), would impose a 
basic subjective standard on contracting parties.  It would be 
possible to defend a standard of this nature with regard to the 
historic South African case law, although whether it would be 
 
 181 Yam Seng (n 6). 
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independently actionable may be more controversial.182  As we 
saw in part II, the Constitutional Court has in the past used the 
phrase good faith in its decisions, but this was usually in the 
sense of an underlying value.  When it comes to public policy, 
unconscionability, and ubuntu, however, could a wider duty of 
objective reasonableness be imposed on parties?  Recent High 
Court jurisprudence discussed in part II above would certainly 
suggest that this is one plausible interpretation of the trajectory 
of the law. 
The South African legislature has already enacted many 
statutes to protect weaker parties, thereby extending 
constitutional-inspired rights and duties which relate to 
community norms and social justice into many areas of 
contracting.  Beyond these statutes, the common law exists as 
the realm of largely commercial contracts.  Here, given the 
heterogeneous nature of South African society, a standard of 
community in contracting should be defined in minimal terms 
with room for the parties to engage in a measure of private 
ordering.183  If a duty of fair dealing is to go beyond a core of 
rationality, with community values intruding into a private 
contractual relationship, the specific business dealings of the 
immediate parties and their context should be used to define 
the notional community whose standards must be 
determinative.184  This allows for the particularist style of 
 
 182 For South African examples of good faith being given as a standard akin to 
honesty or rationality, see South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timber Ltd 2005 (3) SA 
323 (SCA) [33], where it was held that there was a duty “not to frustrate” the 
legitimate exercise by the other party of their rights under a contract; and NBS Boland 
Bank v One Berg River Drive CC and Others 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA) [25]-[28], where a 
standard of rationality fettering the exercise of a discretionary contractual power was 
said to be the same as one of good faith.  For a statement to the effect that the duty of 
good faith in contract does not found an independent challenge to a contract, see 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) [22]. 
 183 Compare the argument in J. Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism: A Formalist 
Restatement of Commercial Contract Law (CUP 2013). 
 184 cf Campbell “Good Faith” (n 134). 
Good Faith in South Africa Printers Version 2.0 (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2019  10:39 AM 
268 JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH LAW [Vol. 1 
adjudication favoured by the Constitutional Court, and is also 
one possible interpretation of the existing case law from this 
court.  Indeed, it is typically egregious cases of exploitative 
conduct which reach this court, with more commercial cases 
like the lease in Everfresh, or the insurance contract in 
Barkhuizen, being slightly atypical.  A general duty of ubuntu-
based communal solidarity beyond this is best left to the private 
ordering devices of a given business community, or the policing 
of unconscionability ex post under the public policy rule.  
Ubuntu should not become an independent ground on which 
to attack contractual dealings, just as this strong role has never 
been permitted to the (narrower) concept of good faith in South 
Africa’s past. 
Ubuntu is a broader standard than good faith – the 
literature and case law speak to a role for community, which 
implies an objective standard of conduct beyond mere honesty.  
There is scope here for a new epistemology185 of contracting, 
which places indigenous social norms at its centre.  Even here, 
however, ubuntu should continue to play the role of underlying 
value in contract law.  The conceptual overlap between good 
faith and ubuntu should be expressly unpacked and clarified by 
the Constitutional Court.  Commercial contracting in an 
indigenous setting relies largely on private ordering for its 
operation, and even there does not generally require a duty of 
altruism or fiduciary loyalty from a contracting party beyond 
the social responsibility of moderate community.  Outside of 
the localised community setting, a healthy dose of minimalism 
should (in my view) be used in defining ubuntu (or good faith), 
with more detailed regulation being left to more context 
sensitive regulatory mechanisms. 
 
 185 By this I refer to the different process by which indigenous law is created in 
South Africa (community practice considered to have binding force, ie the living law) 
and transmitted through generations (via an oral tradition).  Written sources of 
indigenous law are usually disparagingly referred to as ‘official’ law in South Africa. 
See Himonga & Nhlapo, African Customary Law in South Africa (n 92) ch 2. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To a South African reader, my argument thus far may 
have been read as equivocal: on the one hand, I have argued for 
a more inclusive view to be taken of South African contract law 
and practice, particularly with regard to the contexts in which 
business takes place.  Thus, the articulation of ubuntu above 
located this motif in the setting of an indigenous African 
marketplace – as found in South Africa’s popular economies – 
and subject to the norms of the communities that reside there.  
On the other hand, I have argued for a stricter reading of this 
concept than that favoured by many leftist South African 
academics and indeed for one (in part) different from the vision 
of transformative constitutionalism stated in certain leading 
texts.  My defence of this politics of contract law, is that it is one 
which is contextualised within the economic demands of the 
South African marketplace, particularly the need for increased 
business confidence in the political economy, investment, and 
economic growth.  Certainty of contract law is typically a 
feature of legal systems which are popular among merchants, 
such as English law – indeed legal services are a key English 
export.186  It is for this reason that I cite with approval the 
arguments of English theorists Campbell and Morgan above, 
despite the fact that the politics of their commercial contract law 
visions are vastly removed from what is currently fashionable 
in the South African academy.  The incorporation of an 
indigenous norm of ubuntu, as a concept similar to, but in part 
as a replacement of, good faith, into South African contract law, 
is a positive development and a timely politico-legal 
intervention.  This measure should not, however, ignore the fact 
 
 186 Statistics supporting this claim are quoted and discussed in R. Halson & D. 
Campbell, “Harmonisation and its discontents: A transaction costs critique of a 
European contract law” in J. Devenney & M. Kenny (eds), The Transformation of 
European Private Law: Harmonisation, Consolidation, Codification or Chaos? (CUP 2013) 
100. 
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that contracts must be upheld in the indigenous popular 
economy no less than in the context of large commercial 
transactions between blue chip South African companies. 
What I am describing, however, are the norms of the 
commercial marketplace where contracts are concluded by 
parties of similar levels of bargaining power.  This is indeed the 
realm which the common law of contract has been relegated to 
after the advent of a (consumer) statute law specifically 
designed to protect weaker parties.  In consumer law there is a 
clear need for fairness jurisdiction to be given to courts (as well 
as to various lower level alternate dispute resolution tribunals) 
in order to prevent an abuse of market power against weaker 
parties.  There is great scope here for indigenous norms, 
including (but not limited to) ubuntu,187 to be reflected in the 
interpretation of these statutes to give effect to a transformed 
constitutional regime of contracting.  My argument is that it is 
this key differentiation between contexts of contracting which 
leaves room for me to call for a more liberal market/privately 
ordered realm in which the common law can operate. 
In conclusion, and on a comparative law note: the legal 
culture of South Africa is changing fast.  It appears that a similar 
process is happening in other commonwealth jurisdictions: the 
findings of the Canadian Supreme Court in Bhasin speak to a 
movement away from the strictures of the traditional English 
law position.  This reflects similar developments in certain parts 
of Australia,188 and indeed at High Court level within the 
 
 187 For example, Bähre, Money and Violence (n 105) 136 speaks of a value of 
ukunceda, which his research participants, most of whom were of Xhosa ethnicity, 
translated as ‘helping each other’.  Bähre describes how his participants described 
their contract practice as being informed by this value, rather than ubuntu. 
 188 The Australian state of New South Wales in particular seems to be moving 
in this direction, see for example: Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] 
NSWCA 15; Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd (2001) 69 NSWLR 558; 
Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349.   
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English jurisdiction itself.189  It appears that a norm of good faith 
is no longer as controversial as it used to be, but also that the 
methodology of these legal developments remain decidedly 
within the English Common Law tradition and speak to the 
long-held sentiment there that commercial practice should 
govern commercial law.190 
 
 
 189 Yam Seng (n 6). Note that the findings of this case on good faith were in part 
overruled in: Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland 
Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200 [105]. 
 190 Lord Devlin, “The Relation between Commercial Law and Commercial 
Practice” (1951) 14 MLR 249; Lord Goff, “Commercial Contracts and the Commercial 
Court” [1984]  LMCLQ 382; Lord Steyn, “Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable 
Expectations of Honest Men” (1997) 113 LQR 433; C. Mitchell, Contract Law and 
Contract Practice: Bridging the Gap between Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation 
(Hart 2013); Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism (n 183) 
